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DON’T DIE! HOW BIOSIMILAR DISPARAGEMENT
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Michael A. Carrier
ABSTRACT—Competition is the key to low prices in the pharmaceutical
industry. For decades, Americans have benefitted from affordable generic
versions of brand-name drugs. But now, we stand poised on the wave of a
revolution. Biologics, which include lifesaving, cancer-treating drugs, can
cost hundreds of thousands of dollars per year and are forecast to be the
“fastest growing segment of drug spending” in coming years.
The hope, then, is that just like generic drugs, competition from followon products known as biosimilars will lower prices. But the fear is that they
will not. Why? One main reason is disparagement.
Biosimilars are nearly the same as biologics. In fact, they are required
to be “highly similar” to, and have “no clinically meaningful differences”
from, biologics. Despite this, biologic manufacturers have raised ominous
warnings that biosimilars are not the same as biologics but have differences
that pose grave safety consequences. Doctors are getting the message loud
and clear and are refusing to prescribe appropriate—and more affordable—
biosimilars. It thus comes as no surprise that government agencies have
serious concerns about the behavior of biologic companies.
This Essay addresses biologic manufacturers’ disparagement of
biosimilars. It sketches the background of the industry and introduces the
unique regulatory setting. It then sets forth the caselaw and explains how
disparagement can violate antitrust law.
AUTHOR—Distinguished Professor, Rutgers Law School. I would like to
thank Tom Cotter, Shubha Ghosh, Elizabeth Jex, Carl Minniti, and Rebecca
Tushnet for their helpful comments.
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INTRODUCTION
Competition is the key to low prices in the pharmaceutical industry. For
decades, Americans have benefitted from affordable generic versions of
brand-name drugs. But now, as biologics enter the market, we stand on the
precipice of a revolution. In fact, biologics, which can cost patients hundreds
of thousands of dollars per year, are predicted to be the “fastest growing
segment of drug spending in the coming years.”1
The hope, then, is that competition from follow-on products, known as
biosimilars, will lower prices for patients. But pharmaceutical companies’
campaign of biosimilar disparagement threatens to block this goal.

1
Brian K. Chen, Y. Tony Yang & Charles L. Bennett, Why Biologics and Biosimilars Remain So
Expensive: Despite Two Wins for Biosimilars, the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Do Not Solve
Fundamental
Barriers
to
Competition,
DRUGS
(Nov.
16,
2018),
1777,
1777
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30446980 [https://perma.cc/U2BW-48GU]; Press Release, Scott
Gotlieb, Remarks from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., as Prepared for Delivery at the
Brookings Institution on the Release of the FDA’s Biosimilars Action Plan (July 18, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/remarks-fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-mdprepared-delivery-brookings-institution-release-fdas
[https://perma.cc/4BWT-TJFD]
[hereinafter
Remarks from FDA Commissioner].
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Biologics are large, complex molecules derived from living organisms,
most commonly proteins.2 According to the FDA, biologics “often represent
the cutting-edge of biomedical research and, in time, may offer the most
effective means to treat a variety of medical illnesses and conditions” that
have “no other treatments available.”3 Monoclonal antibodies, the most
frequently developed type of biologic,4 include blockbuster products such as
infection-reducing Neulasta,5 as well as Humira6 and Remicade,7 both of
which treat arthritis, colitis, and Crohn’s disease. In targeting unhealthy cells
without harming healthy cells,8 monoclonal antibodies have dramatically
increased survival rates.9 Other types of biologics include vaccines, blood
products, and gene therapies.10
Biosimilars are legally required to be “highly similar” to, and have “no
clinically meaningful differences” from, biologics.11 Despite this
requirement, biologic manufacturers have warned physicians and patients
that the products are not the same, intimating that the differences pose grave
safety concerns. And physicians are listening, refusing to prescribe
appropriate and affordable biosimilars.12 It thus comes as no surprise that
government agencies, like the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), have raised “serious concerns about false
2
Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, 2018 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 5 (2018); What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/center-biologics-evaluation-and-research-cber/what-are-biologics-questions-and-answers
[https://perma.cc/2TGQ-Q3CQ].
3
What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, supra note 2.
4
One report concluded that 338 of the 907 biologics in development were monoclonal antibodies.
PHRMA,
MEDICINES
IN
DEVELOPMENT:
BIOLOGICS
4
(2013),
http://phrmadocs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/biologicsoverview2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA4A-74F5].
5
NEULASTA, https://www.neulasta.com/ [https://perma.cc/EL8D-F9UK].
6
HUMIRA, https://www.humira.com/?cid=ppc_ppd_msft_franchise_brand_2015_humira_Exact_64
X1790908 [https://perma.cc/SQ52-8VY2].
7
REMICADE, https://www.remicade.com/?utm_source=bing&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign
=Branded&utm_content=RAIS%20-%20General&utm_term=remicade&gclid=CJnFzq2_hNICFSi2gQ
od1FgEaQ&gclsrc=ds [https://perma.cc/J3X6-JYSS].
8
How Targeted Therapies Are Used to Treat Cancer, AM. CANCER SOC’Y,
https://www.cancer.org/treatment/treatments-and-side-effects/treatment-types/targeted-therapy/whatis.html [https://perma.cc/334L-KHUA].
9
For example, the development of Rituxan in the 1990s substantially improved the treatment of nonHodgkin’s lymphoma, the most common form of blood cancer in adults. Efrat Dotan, Charu Aggarwal &
Mitchell R. Smith, Impact of Rituximab (Rituxan) on the Treatment of B-Cell Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma,
35 PHARM.
&
THERAPY
148,
148
(2010),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2844047/#!po=23.6842 [https://perma.cc/S6SE-26BK]
(supplementing chemotherapy regimens with Rituxan improved patients’ survival rate from 57% to 70%
in one study).
10
What Are “Biologics” Questions and Answers, supra note 2.
11
42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2) (2012).
12
See infra notes 165–172 and accompanying text.

121

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

or misleading statements and their negative impacts on public health and
competition.”13
This Essay addresses biologic companies’ disparagement of
biosimilars. Part I sketches the background of the industry, and Part II
discusses its unique regulatory setting. Part III then sets forth the caselaw,
while Part IV explains how, under two separate approaches, disparagement
can violate antitrust law.
I.

BIOLOGICS

The relationship between biologics and biosimilars differs from that
between brand-name drugs and their generic counterparts. This Part sketches
these differences and discusses the relevant statute for biologics and
biosimilars, as well as biologic companies’ disparagement of biosimilars.
A. Scientific Differences
The science underlying biologics and small-molecule (brand) drugs is
different. Small molecules are created through a series of chemical reactions
known as chemical synthesis.14 The process is predictable, which allows
generics to cheaply imitate brand drugs.15 Put another way, brands and
generics can put the same pieces of a puzzle together in the same way to
create the same image. Biologics, in contrast, emphasize not the individual
pieces of the puzzle but the way the puzzle is constructed. Because “the
product is the process,” and the use of living cells to create biologics is
inherently sensitive, there is higher variability in the product’s final form.16
This variability presents challenges to biosimilar manufacturers. Even
if these entities can rely on patent disclosures and other materials in the
public domain, they will lack access to critical information that is protected
as a trade secret.17 Because biologics are “so closely defined by their
manufacturing process,” this secrecy blocks competition.18 All of these
13

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, JOINT STATEMENT OF THE FOOD & DRUG
ADMINISTRATION AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REGARDING A COLLABORATION TO ADVANCE
COMPETITION
IN
THE
BIOLOGIC
MARKETPLACE
3
(Feb.
3,
2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1565273/v190003fdaftcbiologicsstatem
ent.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4YS-HMKQ] [hereinafter JOINT STATEMENT].
14
See LAURENCE A. BORDEN, PHARMACEUTICAL AND BIOTECH PATENT LAW §§ C:5.1, C:5.2
(2020).
15
See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
16
JAMES T. O’REILLY & KATHARINE A. VAN TASSEL, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 13:135
(4th ed. 2020). For a discussion of changes during the product’s maturation and uncertainties in the
structure of a protein (a typical biologic), see Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, Biologics: The
New Antitrust Frontier, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2018).
17
W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1769, 1793–94 (2016).
18
Id. at 1794.
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development difficulties minimize the price reductions that biosimilars can
unleash in comparison to generics.
B. Statutory Framework
The framework statute for biologics, the Biologics Price Competition
and Innovation Act (BPCIA),19 was designed to encourage innovation and
competition. To foster innovation, it provides biologic drugs with two
exclusivity periods.20 The first period begins when the biologic (known as
the reference product) is approved and lasts for four years.21 During this
period, the FDA will not accept an application from a biosimilar
manufacturer.22 In the second period, even after the FDA can accept a
biosimilar application, it cannot grant approval until twelve years after the
date the biologic was first licensed.23 This 12-year exclusivity period gives
biologic products strong protection in the marketplace.
The BPCIA fosters follow-on competition through an abbreviated
approval pathway for biosimilars.24 To gain approval as a biosimilar under
the BPCIA, an applicant must show that
the biological product is highly similar to the reference product notwithstanding
minor differences in clinically inactive components; and [] there are no
clinically meaningful differences between the biological product and the
reference product in terms of the safety, purity, and potency of the product.25

A biosimilar manufacturer can show that its product is highly similar to
the reference product by “extensively analyzing . . . the structure and
function” of both products.26 The FDA has made it clear that “[m]inor
differences . . . in clinically inactive components are acceptable,” with the
agency “carefully evaluat[ing]” such disparities to ensure that the biosimilar
“meets FDA’s high approval standards.”27 In fact, “slight differences” are
expected during the manufacturing process, not only for biosimilars but also

19
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 804
(2010).
20
42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7) (2012).
21
Id. § 262(k)(7)(B).
22
Id.
23
Id. § 262(k)(7)(A).
24
Id. § 262(k).
25
Id. § 262(i)(2) (emphasis added).
26
Biosimilar
and
Interchangeable
Products,
FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/biosimilar-and-interchangeable-products [https://perma.cc/BHW
4-YU4W].
27
Id.
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for biologics. As one company has explained, “most biologics vary and . . .
in fact are not identical batch-to-batch. . . .”28
A biosimilar manufacturer’s ability to make these showings assuages
fears that its product is not as safe as the biologic. A coalition of nearly thirty
pharmaceutical regulators from around the world has explained that
biosimilars demonstrate similarity through “extensive laboratory
comparability studies.”29 These studies use “highly sensitive state-of-the-art
analytical technology that allows robust and extensive examination and
comparison of the biosimilar and originator molecules.”30
The benefits of obtaining follow-on approval under the BPCIA differ
from those under the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress’s framework statute for
competition and innovation in the small-molecule, or brand-drug, setting.31
Unlike the Hatch-Waxman regime, in which the first generic manufacturer
to file what is known as a “Paragraph IV” certification (claiming that the
brand’s patent is invalid or not infringed32) is eligible for a 180-day period of
exclusivity, the first to file a biosimilar does not benefit from such
protection.33 Rather, exclusivity is granted only to the first biosimilar that
clears the higher threshold of interchangeability.34
To attain interchangeability status, the applicant must show that the
follow-on version (1) “is biosimilar to the reference product” and (2) “can
be expected to produce the same clinical result as the reference product in
any given patient.”35 For products administered more than once to an
individual, the follow-on maker must show that the risk of switching between
products is not greater than the risk of not switching.36 If the applicant
seeking interchangeability can meet this standard, it will receive exclusivity,
which expires (if certain other litigation or approval thresholds are not

28
Boehringer Ingelheim, Comment Letter on Pfizer’s Citizen Petition to FDA, Docket # FDA-2018P-3281, at 3 (Jan. 25, 2019) [hereinafter Boehringer Letter] (on file with author).
29
ICMRA Statement about Confidence in Biosimilar Products (for Healthcare Professionals), INT’L
COALITION MEDS. REG. AUTHORITIES, http://www.icmra.info/drupal/sites/default/files/201907/ICMRA_statement_about_confidence_in_biosimilar_product_HCP.PDF [https://perma.cc/YKB6P4KF].
30
Id.
31
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).
32
Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
33
42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6) (2012).
34
Id. The standard of “interchangeability” is defined in the statute and is not the same as the use in
common discourse of being substitutable. See id. § 262(k)(2) (defining interchangeability).
35
Id. § 262(k)(4)(A)(i)–(ii).
36
Id. § 262(k)(4)(B).
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reached earlier) one year after commercial marketing.37 The FDA has not yet
approved an interchangeable biosimilar.38
C. Disparagement
In the small-molecule setting, disparagement is not a concern. Brands
are not likely to falsely injure near-identical generics, which garner sales not
from advertising campaigns but from state laws that allow—and in many
cases require—pharmacists to substitute generic versions of brand-name
prescriptions.39 In contrast, the education of stakeholders is critical to the
marketing of biologics and biosimilars,40 which has tempted biologic firms
to engage in disparagement.
There are four related categories of statements and omissions that
biologic firms have made against biosimilars, none of which is consistent
with the statute. The first category is the most dramatic. A January 2019
Washington Post article quotes Philip Schneider, chairman of the Alliance
for Safe Biologic Medicines’ international advisory board, as suggesting
caution in a move to unbranded biologics “so we don’t end up with another
thalidomide [which famously caused birth defects]” or “all the other things
that happen when safety isn’t considered.”41 Offering another example in the
fearmongering category, the article further quotes a patient advocate
affiliated with the group, who stated that a switch from one drug to another
“disrupts your continuity of care,” as “[y]ou could end up in an emergency
room, or be[] hospitalized, or try[] other, less efficient treatments,” all of
which “can exacerbate or flare your disease, bring[ing] it out of remission.”42
37

Id. § 262(k)(6) (specifying that exclusivity expires on earliest of one year after commercial
marketing, 18 months after court judgment or dismissal in patent litigation, 42 months after approval if
litigation pending, or 18 months after approval if applicant has not sued).
38
Biosimilar and
Interchangeable
Biologics:
More
Treatment
Choices,
FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/biosimilar-and-interchangeable-biologics-moretreatment-choices [https://perma.cc/CBD5-KYF6].
39
See Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing
Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1017 (2010); Brad Weltman, Why Pharmaceutical
Advertising
Is
Virtually
Absent
from
the
Web,
ADWEEK
(Nov.
2,
2016),
http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/why-pharmaceutical-advertising-virtually-absentweb-174393 [https://perma.cc/83XC-KA9H].
40
See Awareness of Biosimilars Among U.S. Specialty Physicians Is High but New Survey Identifies
Five
Major
Knowledge
Gaps,
BIOSIMILAR
DEV.
(Nov.
1,
2016),
https://www.biosimilardevelopment.com/doc/awareness-biosimilars-specialty-physicians-surveyidentifies-knowledge-gaps-0001 [https://perma.cc/7SS5-SHMV].
41
Christopher Rowland, ‘Marketers Are Having a Field Day’: Patients Stuck in Corporate Fight
Against Generic Drugs, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2019, 8:00 PM), https://www.adweek.com/brandmarketing/why-pharmaceutical-advertising-virtually-absent-web-174393/
[https://perma.cc/LR4WTP5K].
42
Id.
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The second group of assertions claims that the biosimilar acts
differently from the reference product. In an Amgen YouTube video quoted
in Pfizer’s citizen petition raising awareness of this issue, the company states
that the two products “can behave differently in the body.”43 Amgen also
tweeted: “Biologics or biosimilars? It’s not just apples to apples. While
#biosimilars may be highly similar to their #biologic reference products,
there’s still a chance that patients may react differently.”44 Janssen Biotech
provides a similar, albeit more subtle, example. In a patient brochure, the
company states that a patient “may be asked to switch to a biosimilar that
works in a similar way to REMICADE,” but that “you and your doctor did a
lot of fine tuning to get where you are now,” so “if your REMICADE®
treatment is still working for you, talk to your doctor about staying on it.”45
The third category is based on claims that the biosimilar is not identical
to the reference product. The Amgen video mentioned above states that “no
two biologic medicines are identical.”46 Similarly, Genentech’s website,
again as discussed in the Pfizer citizen petition, states that “FDA requires a
biosimilar to be highly similar, but not identical” to the reference product.47
The fourth group emphasizes that biosimilars do not satisfy the standard
of interchangeability. In the brochure mentioned above, Janssen states that
“[e]ven though infliximab biosimilars are very similar to REMICADE®, that
doesn’t mean they are interchangeable with REMICADE®.” Janssen also
warned (in bolded statements) that “no infliximab biosimilar has been proven
to be interchangeable with REMICADE®” and that “[t]he infliximab
biosimilars are not approved as interchangeable with REMICADE®.” 48
Each of these four categories can constitute disparagement. The first—
consisting of threatening comparisons to Thalidomide and warnings of trips
to the emergency room—needs no explanation. But each of the other
categories also runs afoul of the statute’s requirements. The second
category—that the biosimilar acts differently—fails to mention that the FDA
only approves a biosimilar when it is “highly similar” to and has “no
clinically meaningful differences” from the biologic product.49 In other
words, the biologic and biosimilar products are required to have the same
43
PFIZER INC., CITIZEN PETITION TO FDA 8 (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.bigmoleculewatch.com/
wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/08/Citizen_Petition_from_Pfizer.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YCG-5LN7].
44
Id. at 7.
45
Id. at 8; Janssen Immunology, Remicade Infliximab Brochure (on file with author).
46
CITIZEN PETITION TO FDA, supra note 43 (citation omitted).
47
Id.; Biosimilars vs. Generics: What is the Difference?, EXAMINE BIOSIMILARS,
https://www.examinebiosimilars.com/content/examinebiosimilars/en_us/biosimilars-vs-generics.html
[https://perma.cc/DX9R-Z8GH] (internal citation omitted).
48
Remicade Infliximab Brochure, supra note 45; CITIZEN PETITION TO FDA, supra note 43, at 8.
49
42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2).
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safety and effectiveness profile.50 As the FDA explained in Draft Guidance
issued in February 2020, “representations or suggestions that create an
impression that a biosimilar is not highly similar to its reference product are
likely to be false or misleading.”51
Evidence from Europe, which has witnessed robust biosimilar market
entry, has confirmed that more than “700 million patient days of treatment”
demonstrated that “clinical outcomes with biosimilars match the outcomes
of the reference biologics.”52 This evidence also has revealed that “patient[s]
switching from the reference biologic to the biosimilar . . . is not of concern”
since more than 14,000 switches resulted in “[n]o change in clinical
outcomes.”53 As discussed below,54 disparaging statements, even if not
completely false, are, at a minimum, deceptive in conveying the misleading
interpretation that biosimilars have “clinically meaningful differences” from
their reference biologics.55
The third category—claiming that the biosimilar is not identical—
focuses on an issue that is irrelevant; in fact, it is “normal and expected
within the manufacturing process” for even batches of biologic products
themselves to reveal “[s]light differences.”56 In the Draft Guidance
mentioned above, the FDA “remind[ed] firms that a biosimilar product is not
required to be identical to the reference product” but that it need only be
“highly similar to the reference product notwithstanding minor differences
in clinically inactive components and that there are no clinically meaningful
differences . . . in terms of safety, purity, and potency.”57
Finally, for the fourth category, a biosimilar’s failure to attain
interchangeability does not mean that it is less safe. For starters, this status
only makes sense for biosimilars that will be dispensed at the pharmacy
50
Patient
Materials,
FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/patient-materials
[https://perma.cc/AHW4-NJXF].
51
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PROMOTIONAL LABELING AND ADVERTISING CONSIDERATIONS FOR
PRESCRIPTION BIOLOGICAL REFERENCE AND BIOSIMILAR PRODUCTS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: DRAFT
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 6 (Feb. 2020), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fdaguidance-documents/promotional-labeling-and-advertising-considerations-prescription-biologicalreference-and-biosimilar [https://perma.cc/LHL9-KQWF] [hereinafter PROMOTIONAL LABELING AND
ADVERTISING CONSIDERATIONS].
52
BIOSIMILARS FORUM, STRUCTURAL MARKET CHANGES NEEDED IN U.S. TO ACHIEVE COSTSAVINGS
FROM
BIOSIMILARS
8
(Mar.
19,
2019),
http://biosimilarsforum.org/PDF/BIosimilars_WhitePaper-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/QV4L-DEPV].
53
Id.
54
See infra notes 151–156 and accompanying text.
55
42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2) (defining biosimilars as having no clinically meaningful differences).
56
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
BIOLOGICAL
PRODUCT
DEFINITIONS
1,
https://www.fda.gov/files/drugs/published/Biological-Product-Definitions.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RWASZYX].
57
PROMOTIONAL LABELING AND ADVERTISING CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 51, at 7–8.
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counter (where substitution takes place), but each of the 15 biosimilars that
has entered the U.S. market is dispensed in a hospital or infusion center.58
More fundamentally, as Pfizer pointed out in its citizen petition, its
biosimilar “demonstrated that a single switch does not result in different
safety or efficacy.”59 As the statement from the global regulatory authorities
explained, “[a] full clinical development program[] is not necessary when
extensive laboratory testing has demonstrated that the biosimilar is highly
similar to the originator.”60 And as Boehringer Ingelheim explained in
supporting Pfizer’s petition, “an FDA interchangeability designation is
irrelevant” for “the majority of biologics . . . administered to the patient by
the physician who has written the prescription,” with “misinformation . . .
generated” to “impl[y] that interchangeable biologics are ‘better
biosimilars’ . . . rather than the same biosimilar on which additional data has
been generated.”61
II. REGULATORY SETTING
How should courts analyze the antitrust effects of biologic firms’
disparagement of biosimilars? This Part sets the stage for the antitrust
analysis by discussing the importance of the regulatory regime, showing the
regime’s ineffectiveness, and highlighting the significant barriers to entry
facing biosimilars.
By brief way of background, the antitrust framework that applies to a
single firm acting unilaterally is monopolization. This offense requires a
showing of monopoly power and exclusionary conduct.62 Monopoly power
is “the power to control prices or exclude competition.”63 Biologic firms that
disparage biosimilars are likely to satisfy this element because of their ability

58
Sean McGowan, Five Years On, Biosimilars Need Support From All Health Care Players, STAT
(Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/06/biosimilars-in-us-turn-five/ [https://perma.cc/
4LMG-BDJR]; see Patient Materials, supra note 50; Ana Rose Welch, Biosimilars and the Site of Care:
Current Considerations, BIOSIMILAR DEV. (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.biosimilardevelopment.com/
doc/biosimilars-and-the-site-of-care-current-considerations-0001 [https://perma.cc/8RZN-QXXT].
59
See CITIZEN PETITION TO FDA, supra note 43, at 8 n.34 (citing clinical trials sponsored by the
Norwegian government).
60
ICMRA Statement, supra note 29 (finding that when a biosimilar is “highly similar” to the
originator it can be “approved for the same indications as the originator on the basis of the established
efficacy and safety of the originator”).
61
See Boehringer Letter, supra note 28, at 5.
62
See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
63
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
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to charge and sustain supracompetitive prices in a market characterized by
significant barriers to entry.64
In contrast to monopoly power, the caselaw on exclusionary conduct is
less clear. Courts often distinguish between the “willful acquisition or
maintenance of [monopoly] power” and “growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”65
Considering the regulatory regime can shed critical light on the issue of
exclusionary conduct.
A. Regulatory Regime
As the Supreme Court explained in Verizon Communications v. Trinko,
the starting point for antitrust analysis is the regulatory regime. The Court
stated that antitrust analysis must take “careful account” of “the pervasive
federal and state regulation characteristic of the industry” and “recognize and
reflect the distinctive economic and legal setting of the regulated industry to
which it applies.”66
The Court in Trinko considered not just the existence of a regulatory
regime, but also its effectiveness. In Trinko, the regime was working: phone
companies providing local service were required to “be on good behavior”
and not to discriminate in providing access before entering the long-distance
market.67 Firms that did not satisfy these conditions were subject to financial
penalties, weekly reporting requirements, or the suspension or revocation of
long-distance approval.68
In contrast, regulatory abuse has prevented the biologics regime from
operating as intended. The combination of ineffective FDA regulation and
high barriers to entry ensures a role for antitrust.69

64

Such price increases offer direct proof of monopoly power. Courts also consider indirect proof in
the form of a defendant’s share of the relevant market. See, e.g., In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust
Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 388 n.19 (D. Mass. 2013) (finding “direct evidence of market power” in
allegations that brand firm “had the power to maintain the price of the drug . . . at supracompetitive levels
without losing substantial sales to other products” and that the drug “enjoyed high barriers to entry”).
65
Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570–71.
66
Verizon Comm. Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
67
Id. at 412.
68
Id. at 413.
69
See Herbert Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 140 (2020) (“Many
federal antitrust violations are also breaches of contract, torts, or violations of some other body of law . . .
[and] [t]he remedy in these cases is not to dismiss one or the other claim . . . .”).
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B. Ineffective Regulation
Biosimilar competition in the United States is far from robust. In
Europe, 59 biosimilars have received approval.70 In the United States, 27
biosimilars have been approved (with more than half the approvals occurring
since July 2018).71 In addition, U.S. biosimilars have offered savings of only
15% to 35% (typically on the lower end), far less than the more significant
(often 70%) discounts in Europe.72
The weak U.S. biosimilar market is not the consequence of the FDA’s
lack of effort. In its citizen petition, Pfizer pointed to “various initiatives” the
agency had undertaken “aimed at encouraging and facilitating the
development and approval of biosimilars.”73 Such activities included “the
numerous biosimilar-related guidance documents FDA has issued, the
Agency’s development and distribution of educational materials . . . , the
Agency’s Biosimilar User Fee Act performance goals, and the . . .
Biosimilars Action Plan.”74
Despite these efforts, FDA officials have expressed frustration with the
lack of biosimilar competition. In 2018, Former Commissioner Scott
Gottlieb “worried” that the market for biosimilars “still isn’t established” and
that “[t]he ability for these products to penetrate clinical practice, and gain
acceptance, is still not firm.”75 In addition, Gottlieb lamented that biosimilar
70
Aydin Harston, How the U.S. Compares to Europe on Biosimilar Approvals and Products in the
Pipeline, ROTHWELL FIGG (May 7, 2019), https://www.biosimilarsip.com/2019/05/07/how-the-u-scompares-to-europe-on-biosimilar-approvals-and-products-in-the-pipeline-4/ [https://perma.cc/AAY4JRFD].
71
Biosimilar
Product
Information,
FDA
(June
11,
2020),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/biosimilar-product-information [https://perma.cc/ST4Z-H2C6].
Until recently, significantly more biosimilars had entered the market in Europe, but that gap has closed.
See Per Troein, Max Newton, Jyoti Patel & Kirstie Scott, THE IMPACT OF BIOSIMILAR COMPETITION IN
EUROPE,
IQVIA
4
(Oct.
2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/38461/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native
[https://perma.cc/976B-YUVY] (16 biosimilars launched in Europe as of 2018); McGowan, supra note
58 (15 biosimilars marketed in U.S. as of 2020). The European regime differs from the U.S. in various
ways, but when given the option, doctors have more frequently prescribed (and patients have more
frequently taken) biosimilars. See Samantha DiGrande, European Report Finds Generics and Biosimilars
Key
to
Curbing
Wasteful
Drug
Spending,
AJMC
(Nov.
27,
2018),
https://www.centerforbiosimilars.com/news/european-report-finds-generics-and-biosimilars-key-tocurbing-wasteful-drug-spending [https://perma.cc/P5NP-QWAQ] (noting that certain European countries
have incentives for physicians to prescribe biosimilars).
72
JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 13, at 2; Ying Chen, Jennifer Dikan, Jennifer Heller & Jorge Santos
da Silva, Five Things to Know About Biosimilars Right Now, MCKINSEY & CO. (July 17, 2018),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/five-thingsto-know-about-biosimilars-right-now [https://perma.cc/RFC3-XAR9].
73
CITIZEN PETITION TO FDA, supra note 43, at 2.
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Id.
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Remarks from FDA Commissioner, supra note 1.

130

115:119 (2020)

Don't Die!

competition is “anemic” and that “the real savings” from biosimilars have
been “just a fraction of even the most conservative initial estimates.”76 In
fact, the agency found that “if Americans had the opportunity to purchase
successfully marketed, FDA-approved biosimilar prescription drugs, they
could have saved more than $4.5 billion in 2017.”77 Such savings, however,
will not come to fruition if biologic companies “unfairly delay or derail the
entry of biosimilar competitors” through conduct (discussed in the next Part)
such as patent thickets and anticompetitive contracts.78 Gottlieb expressed
further concern “that the biosimilar manufacturers may pull out” if biologics
“are able to lock up markets even in cases where there’s a fully
interchangeable competitor.”79
Even more on point, Gottlieb “worried” that “there are either deliberate
or unintentional efforts by branded companies to create confusion” about
biosimilars’ safety and effectiveness.80 These messages “can potentially
undermine consumer confidence in biosimilars in ways that are untrue” and
“negatively impact a patient’s judgment about an otherwise safe and
effective product.”81 The FDA and FTC reiterated these concerns in a joint
statement in February 2020 in which they explained that they “support
competitive markets for biologics” and “have serious concerns about false
or misleading statements and their negative impacts on public health and
competition.”82
Compounding the regulatory regime’s inability to effectuate robust
biosimilar competition is the FDA’s failure to (1) approve an interchangeable
or (2) explain the lack of safety consequences from the absence of an
interchangeability designation.83 As the disparagement examples above
show,84 this vacuum has led to assumptions that biosimilars are unsafe as
none have attained the highest standard of substitutability. This
misunderstanding fails to recognize that—even if not as much data is
76

Id.
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Hillel P. Cohen & Dorothy McCabe, Combatting Misinformation on Biosimilars and Preparing
the Market for Them Can Save the U.S. Billions, STAT (June 19, 2019),
https://www.statnews.com/2019/06/19/misinformation-biosimilars-market-preparation/
[https://perma.cc/DE2U-Q7GX].
81
Id.
82
JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 13, at 3.
83
Draft FDA guidance would begin to address this in explaining that “promotional materials for a
reference product should avoid representing or suggesting that a biosimilar product is less safe or effective
than its reference product because it has not been licensed as interchangeable with the reference product.”
PROMOTIONAL LABELING AND ADVERTISING CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 51, at 7.
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See supra Section I.C.
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generated—a finding of biosimilarity is sufficient for patients to have
complete confidence that the product is safe and will work as effectively as
the reference biologic. For if a biosimilar was any less safe or effective, the
FDA never would have approved it in the first place.
C. Barriers to Entry
Exacerbating the regulatory regime’s ineffectiveness are multiple
barriers to entry that have limited the number of U.S. biosimilars, including
development costs, patent thickets, anticompetitive contracts, and
established patients.
The first barrier to entry is the cost of developing biosimilars. As
discussed above,85 biosimilar manufacturers face significant development
hurdles. Not only are the products complex, but key inputs are also hidden
behind trade secrets and opaque manufacturing processes. As a result, unlike
generics, which cost an average of $5 million to bring to market, biosimilar
development involves more intensive and uncertain research and
development, which could result in costs of at least $100 million.86
A second hurdle involves vast patent thickets that biologic companies
have put together. For example, AbbVie has more than 100 patents covering
anti-inflammatory-treating Humira, including more than 50 obtained in 2015
and 2016 combined, just before the patent on the medicine’s active
ingredient expired.87 Similarly, Johnson & Johnson (J&J) has more than 100
patents covering the anti-inflammatory medication Remicade.88 Biosimilar
manufacturers are not able to get around such massive portfolios.89
A third barrier involves an array of conduct by which biologic firms
have bundled products, employed exclusive dealing, and used rebates to
make it harder for rivals to obtain a foothold in the market. Pfizer described
this conduct in its lawsuit challenging J&J’s protection of its biologic
85

See supra Section I.A.
BIOSIMILARS FORUM, QUANTIFYING THE VALUE OF BIOSIMILARS 2 (2018),
http://biosimilarsforum.org/PDFs/Biosims%20Value%20Whitepaper%202018-0614_Revised_20180712.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7WX-R829]; Scott Gottlieb, How Obama’s FDA Keeps Generic Drugs Off
the Market, 113 MO. MED. 444, 444 (2016); Henry G. Grabowski, David B. Ridley, Kevin A. Schulman
& Tomas J. Philipson, Entry and Competition in Generic Biologics, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON.
439, 443 (2007).
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Cynthia Koons, This Shield of Patents Protects the World’s Best-Selling Drug, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Sep. 7, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-07/thisshield-of-patents-protects-the-world-s-best-selling-drug [https://perma.cc/GPW7-VUZ4].
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See, e.g., RICHARD GONZALEZ, ABBVIE LONG-TERM STRATEGY 14 (Oct. 30, 2015),
http://www.biotechduediligence.com/uploads/6/3/6/7/6367956/abbvie_strategy_presentation__1_.pdf
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Remicade at the expense of Pfizer’s rival Inflectra.90 Pfizer challenged J&J’s
exclusive contracts, made up of (1) “express terms that would exclude
biosimilars” from “medical policies and drug formularies” and (2) “fail first”
provisions, which “require a patient to first try and fail on Remicade before
the insurance company would reimburse Inflectra or another biosimilar.”91
Pfizer also claimed that J&J “bundled rebates across multiple products,”
forcing insurers to “pay a higher price on other [J&J] products” if they
“refuse[d] to grant exclusivity to Remicade.”92
The fourth and final barrier is presented by established patients. These
“incontestable patients” “represent inelastic demand” as they are “‘highly
unlikely’ to [switch] to a biosimilar,” even in response to a price increase.93
For that reason, Pfizer challenged J&J’s “all-or-nothing” program, which
“bundles the base of existing Remicade patients with new patients.”94 By
“premising rebates on this incontestable population,” J&J sought to use a
“rebate trap,” forcing insurers to “exclude Inflectra from competing for new
patients.”95
* * *
The combined effect of these entry barriers exacerbates the problem.
The cost of development limits the universe of biosimilars, and patent
thickets make it extremely difficult to enter many markets. Existing patients
are difficult to move to new medicines—even when they are more
affordable. Rebates, bundling, and exclusive dealing threaten to link existing
and new patients together. And on top of these existing barriers,
disparagement dissuades the remaining new patients, taking away what
should be the most receptive segment of the market: those not locked into
existing regimens. Before determining if disparagement violates antitrust
law, the next Part analyzes the approaches courts have applied to this
conduct.
III. CASELAW
In analyzing the antitrust effects of disparagement, courts have adopted
one of three approaches. This Part discusses the three: no-liability, de
minimis, and case-by-case analyses.
90

Pfizer Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 333 F. Supp. 3d 494, 498–99 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
Id. Fail first provisions are essentially a form of exclusive dealing since “if a patient fails first on
Remicade, it would ‘defy sound medical judgment’ for a physician to switch to a therapeutic equivalent
biosimilar, such as Inflectra, rather than try another therapy.” Id.
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A. No-Liability
The first approach, which has been applied by the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits, reasons that false statements enhance competition in advertising
markets and thus that disparagement-based antitrust claims are not
actionable. For example, the Fifth Circuit has drawn a distinction between
“business torts, which harm competitors, and truly anticompetitive activities,
which harm the market.”96 It has also stated that “absent a demonstration that
a competitor’s false advertisements had the potential to eliminate, or did in
fact eliminate, competition, an antitrust lawsuit will not lie.”97 Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit stated bluntly that “[c]ommercial speech is not actionable
under the antitrust laws.”98 In particular, this court asserted that “[a]ntitrust
law condemns practices that drive up prices by curtailing output,”
distinguishing “[f]alse statements about a rival’s goods [that] do not curtail
output in either the short or long run,” but instead “just set the stage for
competition in a different venue: the advertising market.”99
This hands-off approach is not persuasive. There is not such a “rigid
distinction” between “business torts, which harm competitors, and truly
anticompetitive activities, which harm the market.”100 Deceptive statements
could depress demand for the criticized product, thereby reducing output and
increasing price.101 Many false statements are made about the defendant’s
own products, with false superiority claims discouraging consumers from
using any competitor’s products.102 More fundamentally, misleading
advertising forces competitors to fight back on unfair ground, expending
resources defending truth against falsehood instead of investing them
elsewhere, harming their overall ability to compete. And as Professor
Rebecca Tushnet has written, “corrective advertising, especially by an

96

Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 842 F.3d 883, 895 (5th Cir. 2016).
Id.
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Sanderson v. Culligan Int’l Co., 415 F.3d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 2005).
99
Id. at 623.
100
Shubha Ghosh, The Antitrust Logic of Biologics, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 46, 53 (2018)
(citing Retractable Techs., 842 F.3d at 895).
101
See Kevin S. Marshall, Product Disparagement Under the Sherman Act, Its Nurturing and
Injurious Effects to Competition, and the Tension Between Jurisprudential Economics and
Microeconomics, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 231, 253 (2006) (finding it “short-sighted to conclude that
the intentional dissemination of false information about a rival’s product does not constitute a restraint of
trade” since it “restrains the autonomous forces of supply and demand, and is therefore injurious to
competition”).
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3,
11),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3593914
[https://perma.cc/L2BA-EL2A]
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inherently-less-credible-because-self-interested competitor, is unlikely to fix
all the damage of false advertising.”103
By engaging in deception, a company—in particular, a monopolist—
could entrench its position in the market. And this conduct could (based on
the dichotomy drawn in a leading Supreme Court monopolization case)
resemble more the “willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly]
power” than a “superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”104
Or the deception, applying another landmark case, could be viewed as
“tend[ing] to impair the opportunities of rivals” and “not further[ing]
competition on the merits.”105
B. De Minimis
The second approach, represented by the Second, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits, applies a presumption that the exclusionary effects of
disparagement are de minimis.106 The plaintiff can rebut such a presumption
by showing that the alleged anticompetitive conduct is (1) clearly false, (2)
clearly material, (3) clearly likely to induce reasonable reliance, (4) made to
buyers without knowledge of the subject matter, (5) continued for prolonged
periods, and (6) not readily susceptible to neutralization or other offsets by
rivals.107 Courts are not consistent on whether a plaintiff must show each of
the six factors.108
In creating such strict requirements, the framework ensures that the vast
majority of false advertising, perpetuated by firms lacking market power,
does not automatically violate antitrust law. But it overshoots the mark in
making it nearly impossible to find antitrust liability even for monopolists
bringing about substantial competitive harm.
103

Rebecca Tushnet, Fifth Circuit Reverses Multimillion-Dollar Antitrust Verdict Based on False
Advertising, Remands, REBECCA TUSHNET (Dec. 6, 2016), https://tushnet.com/2016/12/06/fifth-circuitreverses-multimillion-dollar-antitrust-verdict-based-on-false-advertising-remands-2/
[https://perma.cc/5BS7-CQFC].
104
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
105
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 n.32 (1985) (quotation
omitted). For additional critiques of the no-liability approach, see also Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 102,
at 10–13.
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See Duty Free Ams., Inc. v. Estée Lauder Cos., 797 F.3d 1248, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2015); Lenox
MacLaren Surgical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 762 F.3d 1114, 1127–28 (10th Cir. 2014); Am. Council of
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108 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997); Nat’l Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs., Inc. v. Ayerst Labs., 850 F.2d 904,
916 (2d Cir. 1988).
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Duty Free Ams., 797 F.3d at 1269.
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See, e.g., Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons, 323 F.3d at 371 (“We
decline to consider each element or hold that all elements must be satisfied to rebut the de minimis
presumption.”).
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In assessing the appropriateness of the de minimis factors, it is worth
considering false advertising law, which offers a ready-made template for
assessing the harmful effects of false and misleading advertising. For an
advertisement to be actionable, it must contain false or misleading statements
that are material, that deceive or are likely to deceive consumers, and that
cause or are likely to cause harm to the plaintiff.109
Considering false advertising law raises questions about the propriety
of the factors making up the de minimis framework. For example, a clear
falsity requirement does not reflect false advertising’s concern with
misleading statements, which could be literally true or ambiguous but still
induce consumers to reach false conclusions.110 In fact, “[c]onsumers are less
likely to argue against associations they came up with themselves, and more
likely to remember and act on them.”111 Additionally, reasonable reliance
duplicates false advertisement’s materiality factor while overemphasizing
the fraud-like idea—not present in false advertising law—of “reasonable”
reliance. Nor do the other factors in the de minimis test capture the reality of
false advertising, which is not readily susceptible to neutralization and which
can still be effective even if directed to buyers with knowledge of the subject
matter. In short, in departing from the basics of false advertising law, the de
minimis framework raises questions.112 Despite these shortcomings, because
it represents the state of the law in many courts, I take the de minimis test as
a given in this piece.
A case from the medical device industry, Lenox MacLaren Surgical
Corp. v. Medtronic,113 provides one potential guidepost for analysis based on
the de minimis approach. In that case, Lenox, a manufacturer of bone mills
used in spinal-fusion surgery,114 entered into an agreement by which
Medtronic distributed the product to hospitals.115 After the agreement broke
down, Lenox alleged that Medtronic engaged in disparagement that
109

See Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 102, at 7.
See, e.g., Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004); Fed. Trade
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constituted monopolization by telling potential customers that its device was
dangerous and helping to initiate a recall.116 Applying the six-factor test, the
Tenth Circuit found that Lenox offered evidence to rebut the presumption of
a de minimis impact on competition.117
The court’s discussion of three of the six factors is instructive.118 For the
fourth factor, whether the alleged statement was made to buyers without
knowledge of the subject matter, the court found that “even sophisticated
consumers [like hospitals and group purchasing organizations] would rely
on Medtronic’s false statements.”119 For the fifth factor, whether the false
statement continued for prolonged periods, the court found that the continued
listing of Lenox’s device on the FDA’s website as recalled was enough to
show a prolonged period.120 And the court found the sixth factor, whether the
plaintiff could show that it could not readily neutralize the disparaging
statement, was satisfied from “worries involving malpractice liability,”
which resulted in “hospitals [being] unwilling to purchase” recalled
products.121 The Lenox case offers a roadmap for how a plaintiff can satisfy
this framework.
C. Case-by-Case
A third group of courts, led by the Third, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits,
takes a case-by-case approach in assessing whether the alleged
disparagement violates antitrust law. For example, the Third Circuit has
explained that “anticompetitive conduct can include . . . making false
statements about a rival to potential investors and customers” and that
“defamation, which plainly is not competition on the merits, can give rise to
antitrust liability, especially when it is combined with other anticompetitive
acts.”122 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has recognized that “fraudulent
misrepresentations” are “well within” the universe of anticompetitive
conduct.123 And the Eighth Circuit has explained that an alleged monopolist’s
“full frontal attack” that “(1) used false, misleading and deceptive
advertising and (2) was directed at (a) consumers and (b) travel agents”
116
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demonstrated an unreasonable restraint because of its “purpose of preventing
any effective competition.”124
Courts applying the case-by-case approach have appreciated that
anticompetitive conduct takes “too many different forms, and is too
dependent upon context, for any court or commentator ever to have
enumerated all the varieties.”125 Under this approach, one relevant factor
could be the role the conduct plays in a competitor’s ability to finance high
expenses. In one case, for example, the Third Circuit determined that false
statements to investors about a competitor’s financial health caused the rival
to pay inflated financing costs on its debt and, in combination with other
actions, demonstrated anticompetitive conduct sufficient to survive a motion
to dismiss.126
A second factor that courts have analyzed under the case-by-case
approach is the extent to which false statements lock in decision-making. In
United States v. Microsoft Corp., for example, the D.C. Circuit found that
deceptive statements to Java-based software developers about the
interoperability of Windows-based systems with other platforms resulted in
the inadvertent development of software compatible only with Windows and
demonstrated anticompetitive conduct.127
Though courts have considered the two factors mentioned above, the
case-by-case analyses apply a totality of the circumstances approach. By
analyzing conduct as a whole without requiring a showing exceeding de
minimis harm, this approach offers flexibility for biosimilar manufacturers
bringing disparagement claims.
* * *
In sum, antitrust courts apply three very different frameworks when
considering deception-based claims. The first, unjustifiable approach,
abandons antitrust liability. The other two, considered more fully in the next
Part, apply the strict standards of the de minimis framework and the more
flexible standards of the case-by-case approach.
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IV. ANTITRUST VIOLATION
Biologic manufacturers’ disparagement of biosimilars can violate
antitrust law. This Part shows how biologics typically have monopoly power.
It then applies the two primary judicial approaches to the conduct, finding
that monopolization is likely under both the de minimis and case-by-case
approaches.128
As an initial matter, as applied to monopolists’ deceptive conduct,
antitrust law offers unique advantages over false advertising law.129 For
example, as compared to false advertising law, antitrust offers more powerful
remedies of treble damages, automatic (as opposed to exceptional) attorneys’
fees,130 and injunctive relief preventing the behavior’s continuation,131 as well
as a more expansive universe of potential plaintiffs, all of which promise to
provide robust deterrence.
A. Monopoly Power
A monopolization case consists of monopoly power and exclusionary
conduct.132 The first element is monopoly power, which courts have defined
as “the power to control prices or exclude competition.”133 Monopoly power
can be shown in one of two ways. First, it can be proved indirectly by
examining a defendant’s market share along with barriers to entry that could
entrench that market position.134 Courts regularly hold that a 90% market
share supports monopoly power, with some courts finding a 75% share to be
sufficient.135
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15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
129
See generally Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 102, at 22–25 (explaining that antitrust offers more
powerful remedies and contemplates a broader array of potential plaintiffs).
130
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Second, a plaintiff can prove monopoly power directly,136 such as when
a brand firm is able to “maintain the price of [a] drug . . . at supracompetitive
levels without losing substantial sales . . . .”137 Direct proof of monopoly
power can also consist of observable effects on the market such as a price
increase or output reduction.138
The Supreme Court has held that a market can consist of a single
product.139 Lower courts have also found that a single drug can constitute its
own market, which has led naturally to the conclusion that a single drug can
have monopoly power.140 Where potential purchasers have no alternative to
using a drug, monopoly power is likely.
Biologics are likely to have monopoly power. There has been very
limited entry of biosimilars in the United States. Biologics make up 7 of the
top 10 highest-selling drugs in the country.141 And manufacturers charge
astronomical prices, as much as hundreds of thousands of dollars per year
for a product.142 Even though biologics make up less than 2% of the market,
they represent 40% of prescription drug spending.143 Pfizer offered one
example of monopoly power in its lawsuit against J&J, claiming that J&J’s
10% price increase did not affect its 96% market share, with 90% of
providers refusing to stock Pfizer’s competing product.144
Given biologics’ control over markets and ability to charge high prices
without suffering losses, a plaintiff should be able to demonstrate that the
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products have monopoly power.145 Having satisfied monopoly power, the
next element is exclusionary conduct. As discussed above,146 the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits would not find liability under the first approach. But that is
only because they abandon antitrust analysis. That is not a justifiable
approach. Disparagement could cement a biologic’s status as an
unchallenged monopolist. And as confirmed by the various barriers to entry
discussed above,147 the biologic would not easily lose that monopoly
position.
B. De Minimis
The Second, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits apply the de
minimis framework to deception-based conduct. As discussed above,148
courts applying this framework presume that the exclusionary effects of
disparagement are de minimis. The plaintiff can rebut such a presumption by
showing that the alleged anticompetitive conduct is (1) clearly false, (2)
clearly material, (3) clearly likely to induce reasonable reliance, (4) made to
buyers without knowledge of subject matter, (5) continued for prolonged
periods, and (6) not readily susceptible to neutralization or other offsets by
rivals.149 The remainder of this Section applies the framework.150
The first factor requires clear falsity. It is unclear exactly what counts
as “clearly false.” But the relevant underlying law, false advertising, targets
not only false, but also misleading, conduct.151 And, given that the FTC is the
government agency most directly focused on challenging or misleading
deceptive conduct, its analysis is particularly instructive. In a policy
statement, the FTC explained that deception can involve “omission of
material information, the disclosure of which is necessary to prevent the
claim . . . from being misleading.”152 Ensuring a robust interpretation, the
FTC made clear that when a seller’s representation “conveys more than one
meaning to reasonable consumers, one of which is false, the seller is liable
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for the misleading interpretation.”153 “[I]t can be deceptive,” the FTC
explained, “to tell only half the truth, and to omit the rest.”154 Such a situation
“may occur where a seller fails to disclose qualifying information” needed
to prevent an “affirmative statement[] from creating a misleading
impression.”155
These types of omissions and half-truths have appeared in the biologic
setting. Genentech, Amgen, and Janssen each have made assertions that
implied differences between biologics and biosimilars, warning that the
products were “not identical,” that “patients may react differently” to
biosimilars, that biologics “cannot be copied exactly,” that switches “carr[y]
risks, given that no two biologic medicines are identical,” that “[s]witching
drugs is not a good idea if your medicine is working for you,” and that a
failure to achieve interchangeability threatens safety.156 At a minimum (and
applying a conservative analysis), these assertions result in at least one
interpretation to a reasonable consumer that there are clinically meaningful
differences between the biologic and the biosimilar. But this innuendo is
false. And to the sophisticated actors at the biologic companies, this is not
likely to be an oversight.157
Turning to the second factor, the statements would be clearly material.
The FTC has defined a “material” misrepresentation as “one which is likely
to affect a consumer’s choice” of product.158 Such an assertion targets
“information that is important to consumers.”159 The FTC presumes that even
implied claims “are material if they pertain to the central characteristics of
the product, such as its safety. . . .”160 Similarly, “omissions [are] material if
they significantly involve health. . . .”161 To state the obvious, denigrating a
biosimilar product is material. It is hard to imagine a statement more material
than one warning of health concerns with a competitor’s product.
Third, biologic manufacturers’ statements would clearly be likely to
induce reasonable reliance. A representation about a biosimilar’s safety is
exceedingly likely to discourage the patient from purchasing the product. At
153
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the same time, doctors also would be less likely to prescribe the biosimilar
and payors would be less likely to reimburse biosimilars. And not only would
there be reliance, but it would also be reasonable given the unparalleled
consequences of taking unsafe medications.162
Fourth, the statements would be made to buyers without knowledge of
the subject matter. Doctors rely on the pharmaceutical industry, “the most
typical source of information about biosimilars,” with prescriptions based on
information disseminated by the industry.163 In fact, doctors “report being
unsure how to go about explaining biosimilars to patients, which further
restricts their use.”164 This is unfortunate, as “positive framing can improve
patients’ perceptions of biosimilars and increase their hypothetical
willingness to switch to a biosimilar from a biologic treatment.”165 Perhaps it
is not a surprise then that patients “hold concerns about biosimilars,
particularly relating to safety, efficacy, manufacturing and clinical trials that
need to be addressed to improve acceptability.”166
The Lenox case discussed above167 supports a finding that the fourth
factor is satisfied. That court found that “even sophisticated consumers [like
hospitals and group purchasing organizations] would rely on false
statements.”168 Here, it does not take a lot in the way of innuendo to dissuade
patients from taking, and doctors from prescribing, biosimilars. Again,
doctors rely on the pharmaceutical industry as “the most typical source of
information about biosimilars.”169 Given doctors’ obligations to keep abreast
of industry standards and avoid prescribing products with safety concerns, it
is concerning that “the information disseminated by the pharmaceutical
industry affects [doctors’] prescription decisions.”170
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Fifth, the statements’ effect would likely last for prolonged periods. In
the Lenox case, the court found that the continued listing of Lenox’s device
on the FDA’s website as recalled was enough to show a prolonged period.171
Biologic companies have control over the market, and this factor would seem
to be easily satisfied as they would be likely to promulgate the assertions for
lengthy periods of time to maintain their monopolies.
Sixth, the plaintiff would not be able to readily neutralize the
disparaging statements. Once a safety concern is raised, it is particularly
difficult to rebut. Consumers taking, and doctors prescribing, follow-on
products that are not exactly the same as the original would tend to shy away
from products with safety concerns. Given the dire consequences of drugs
operating differently, it is natural to err on the side of avoiding biosimilars.
At its core, the Lenox court emphasized the effect of potential liability
concerns in secondary markets. Similarly, the central issue confronting
doctors in prescribing biosimilars would be whether they are convinced the
product operates in a similar manner to the biologic, or instead threatens
patients’ safety or diminishes efficacy of treatment. Lenox provides a useful
guidepost to future courts in emphasizing liability fears as a factor that can
overcome the presumption of a de minimis impact on competition.
In short, a plaintiff challenging a biologic firm’s disparagement of a
biosimilar would likely satisfy the second through sixth factors of the de
minimis test. A court applying a high standard for the first factor might find
that the conduct, although misleading, is not “clearly false.” In applying the
factors, courts should consider false advertising law and the FTC’s
consideration of the issue, which would recommend liability. And, at a
minimum, for courts that do not require each of the factors to be satisfied,172
liability would most likely be found based on the presence of at least five of
the six factors.
C. Case-by-Case
The case-by-case approach would be even more likely to find liability.
By analyzing conduct as a whole without requiring a showing exceeding de
minimis harm, the case-by-case approach offers flexibility that increases the
likelihood of successful disparagement claims. This flexible framework
would allow courts to consider the regulatory setting and the FDA’s lack of
success in fostering robust biosimilar competition. It would also recognize
the irreversible and lasting effects of locking new patients into biologics
because they do not trust biosimilars. And, finally, it would consider the
171
172
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effects of disparagement in cementing the multiple barriers to entry that
entrench the biologic’s power.
Cases that have applied this approach offer building blocks for liability.
Like the Third Circuit case mentioned earlier involving false statements
impacting a rival’s financing costs,173 disparagement could adversely affect
a biosimilar company’s ability to finance already-high expenses. Moreover,
like the D.C. Circuit case, which found that deceptive statements resulted in
anticompetitive conduct,174 false statements could lock in physician decisionmaking.175
The case-by-case approach could also allow plaintiffs to demonstrate
that parties with monopoly power have satisfied the elements of the false
advertising offense.176 Given the “near certainty” of anticompetitive effects
in this setting, Professor Rebecca Tushnet and I have suggested that courts
should adopt a presumption of monopolization when the elements at the core
of false advertising law are satisfied.177
Through its less regimented analysis, the case-by-case approach
increases the likelihood that biologic companies would be found liable for
monopolistic conduct. The approach would more likely consider the factors
highlighted in Part II above (such as significant barriers to entry and the
FDA’s ineffectiveness in bringing about robust biosimilar competition),
allowing plaintiffs to show how these factors exacerbate anticompetitive
effects of increased price and reduced output, and it would enable plaintiffs
to illustrate how disparagement offers no legitimate procompetitive
justifications.
CONCLUSION
Biologics are the wave of the future, promising to unleash revolutionary
health benefits. But their price tag is staggering. And if biologic
manufacturers can stifle more affordable biosimilars in their cradle by
ominously implying false safety concerns, patients will suffer. Recognizing
an antitrust cause of action for disparagement promises to enhance
competition and help U.S. consumers afford life-saving medicines.
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